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Abstract
Understanding how attorneys’ perceptions of “insider” and “outsider” status affect negotiations is of
both theoretical and practical importance for understanding the judicial system. We utilize a
comprehensive survey of attorneys from one state to explore views of trustworthiness and
negotiations. Overall, as attorneys become more embedded in their in-group, they increasingly
report lower trust levels and less effective negotiations with outsiders. These relationships do vary
somewhat by the scope and location of the attorney’s practice. Our findings provide insight into
one possible causal mechanism underlying the “repeat player” advantage; they also suggest new
directions for research on case outcomes.

*Authors’ names are listed alphabetically, and each contributed equally to the project. We thank the
Public Policy Institute at Western Carolina University for providing support.

Writing nearly fifty years ago, Abraham Blumberg characterized the criminal justice system
as operating with “almost pathological distrust of ‘outsiders’ bordering on group paranoia” (1967:
21-22). In addition to the criminal law context, the centrality of repeated interactions has also been
observed in many civil contexts, from divorce settlements (Mather, McEwin, and Maiman 2001;
Sarat and Feltstiner 1986) to insurance disputes (Galanter 1974) to the appellate context (Kritzer
2003). One factor related to trust and fruitful interactions among lawyers involves whether one is
viewed as a member of the “in group” or as an outsider. To illustrate, one online service for finding
legal representation has this advice about the advantages and disadvantages of being represented by
a local public defender: “Public defenders work with the same judges and prosecutors day in and day
out, and get to know their personal quirks, peeves, and tolerances. They also see the same police
officers testifying, and know who’s likely to be a bad (and good) witness… A public defender is
likely to be very efficient at sizing up your case and presenting an acceptable plea bargain deal to the
prosecutor and judge.”1
Implied within this general statement is that an attorney from outside the judicial district
would not be cognizant of the “quirks” of local judges, prosecutors, and other legal actors. Indeed,
one study of New England divorce lawyers concluded that a “local community of practice defines
the home environment for lawyers, and as such, it appears comfortably familiar to them” (Mather,
McEwin, and Maiman 2001: 59). Thus, knowledge of legal practitioners’ habits, personalities, and
routines may directly condition success or failure of pre-trial negotiation.
In contrast to popular perceptions about the legal system, it has been well established that
the majority of litigated disputes never reach trial and are resolved through pre-trial settlement in
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This quote is drawn from Martindale-Hubbard’s free online service for finding legal representation.

Available at: http://criminal.lawyers.com/criminal-law-basics/public-defenders.html.
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civil cases (Eisenberg and Lanvers 2009; Kritzer 1991; Galanter 2004; Miller and Sarat 1980) or plea
bargains in criminal cases (Galanter 2004; Miller and Sarat 1980; Roberts 2003). Nearly all of these
negotiations occur with minimal, if any, outside oversight, meaning that the outcomes of most cases
are largely decided before the parties appear before the presiding judge. For this reason, the
personal relationships between attorneys can be key in the resolution of cases. Yet pre-trial
negotiation procedures and attorney interactions have received relatively little scholarly attention,
largely because these procedures are not recorded for easy data collection and are often required to
be confidential.
To explore this limitation in the prior literature, this study investigates whether attorneys
who are “outsiders” face a disadvantage relative to “insiders” when it comes to a critical ingredient
of negotiating success: trust. We have two primary goals with respect to this question. First, we
wish to ascertain whether a relationship exists between attorney interactions and trust for attorneys
as a group, in order to draw broader conclusions about the impact of trust in the negotiation
process. Secondarily, we are interested in how this relationship plays out for specific practice areas
in the legal profession, given the increasing stratification and specialization of law firms (Heinz and
Laumann 1982). Certain areas of law may be more influenced by insider favoritism than others, and
negotiation with other attorneys figures more prominently in some practice areas than in others.
This dual strategy allows us to identify evidence of commonalities in the profession (taken as a
whole) but also to unpack what this argument tells us about attorneys’ working relationships across a
range of diverse practice settings. To be clear, we are not able to assess whether perceptions of trust
translate into successful outcomes for our respondents’ clients in this article; however, we contend
that understanding attorney attitudes is a necessary first step in thinking about advantages in the
legal process.
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Below, we begin by outlining our conception of trust, the role it plays in negotiations, and
how in-group and out-group dynamics affect the relative power of individuals. Next, we link this to
research that specifically examines influences on attorney relationships and how these vary across
different practice settings. We test our expectations using survey data collected from practicing
attorneys in North Carolina and find support for the presumption that trust levels and negotiations
are different between “insiders” and “outsiders,” though this effect varies somewhat across specialty
and practice setting.

Trust and cooperation among insiders and outsiders
Research from the fields of political science and social psychology acknowledges the
importance of trust in facilitating interpersonal communication and cooperation. The concept of
trust can be further broken down to distinguish between trust based on a person’s general
disposition and trust that is based on personal experiences and information. For instance, Uslaner
(2002, 15) defines moralistic trust as “demonstrated faith in others without expecting anything
specific in return” and means one trusts strangers, even those who are likely to be different from
oneself, without regard to specific experiences with others. Groups who have experienced
discrimination in society, such as minorities and women, tend to express lower levels of generalized
or moralistic trust in surveys (Uslaner 2002; Feingold 1994; but see Buchan, Croson, and Solnick
2008). In contrast, knowledge-based trust reflects personal experiences and information, such as
prior working experience with an attorney or knowledge of a particular attorney’s professional
reputation.
Uslaner’s work suggests that individuals’ interactions with “insiders” and “outsiders” are
likely shaped by both generalized and knowledge-based trust. Social psychologists have documented
a strong tendency of individuals to extend “trust, positive regard, cooperation, and empathy” to
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those in their in-group (Brewer 1999). By assimilating into and identifying with a group, individuals
express a greater preference for and trust of those in their in-group (Hewstone, Rubin, and Hazel
2002). In the legal profession, an attorney with high generalized trust should be more likely to trust
all attorneys, regardless of whether they come from the same in-group or not. This positive
orientation is not affected by specific interactions in which trust is violated, such as an opposing
attorney breaking a promise or engaging in discovery abuse. In contrast, an attorney who relies
heavily on knowledge-based trust would be more trusting of familiar individuals whom he views
favorably and may be less trusting of outsiders based on his lack of knowledge about that attorney.
This type of information-based trust may stem from directly interacting repeatedly and positively
with ones in-group, or, as Kritzer (2004) notes, from familiarity with attorneys’ reputations for being
fair and reasonable. Working closely with their legal community allows attorneys to develop
relationships and reputations which lead directly to cooperation and reciprocity.
Influences on Attorney Relationships
Research on the legal settlement and negotiation process also supports the expectation that
trust between lawyers is related to “insider” or “outsider” status and conditions the effectiveness of
pretrial negotiations.2 Gilson and Mnookin (1994) use a game theoretic framework to show that the
relationship between opposing lawyers and their reputations affects the dispute resolution processes.
Attorneys are better able to facilitate cooperation, settle cases, and reduce transaction costs when
opposing lawyers know and trust each other. Information asymmetries can impede the settlement
process and encourage disputes to go to trial (Bebchuck 1984). Additionally, some work suggests
2

Of course, the particulars of negotiation processes vary from area to area. Kritzer (1991) finds that

the amount and intensity of negotiations with other counsel varies by type of case, complexity,
stakes involved, and the match-up.
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that clients who hire the same attorneys repeatedly also win more often in arbitration (Bingham
1997; Colvin 2001). Johnston and Waldfogel (2002) find that cases that involve attorneys who
frequently appear together in pairs are resolved more quickly and are more likely to settle, while
cases that involve at least one non-local attorney are more likely to be tried and last longer.
Furthermore, both the repeat player and courtroom workgroup literature suggest that
attorneys’ working relationships and familiarity with each other significantly shape the litigation
process. Galanter (1974) famously describes the advantages of repeat players in litigation, including
experience, expertise, reputation, and informal relationships with the legal community. While
Galanter’s work largely focused on repeat litigants before civil trial courts, scholarly research
consistently notes that attorneys are key repeat players in all areas of the judiciary. A significant body
of work concludes that attorney experience (McAtee and McGuire 2007; McGuire 1995; Szmer,
Johnson, and Sarver 2007) and expertise and capability (Haire, Lindquist, and Hartley 1999; Haynie
and Sill 2007; Szmer and Ginn 2014) are critical factors. Empirical tests of Galanter’s thesis show
that lawyers can use their positions as insiders to the advantage of their clients (Harris 1999; Harris
et al. 2013), and small, local firms appear to use familiarity with the local legal community to offset
the resource imbalances they encounter when facing larger, out-of-town firms (Dumas, Haynie, and
Daboval 2015). In medical malpractice litigation, both plaintiff and defense attorneys are repeat
players and use their expertise to achieve higher success rates and garner larger awards for their
clients (Daniels and Martin 2006). Other prior studies on the courtroom workgroup in criminal
cases demonstrate that attorneys’ working relationships affect the length of sentences meted out
(Eisenstein and Jacob 1977; Haynes, Ruback, and Cusick 2010; Ulmer and Johnson 2004; Ulmer and
Kramer 1996).
Relatedly, legal scholars studying forum selection in diversity cases have found that
attorneys’ choice of forum is influenced by concerns about bias against out-of-state attorneys, as
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well as bias against non-local clients and attorneys. Bumiller (1980-1) finds that attorneys are more
worried about anti-local bias in rural areas than in urban or suburban areas. A more recent study
identified similar trends, noting that concern about anti-local bias was more prevalent in Southern
states (Miller 1991). However, Mather, McEwin, and Maiman (2001: 59-60) find ample evidence of
anti-local bias in their interviews with New England attorneys, with lawyers from small or rural
communities characterizing lawyers from urban areas as more confrontational and aggressive.
Prior scholarship and theory suggest that trusting relationships among lawyers stem from
both past actions and the potential for future interactions. Past successful interactions between
actors may develop a mutual reputation for honesty and a behavioral commitment to continued
trustworthiness between the actors (Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000). Attorneys thus develop
opinions about the other attorneys based on the reliability of information shared through repeated
interactions. Certain attorneys may develop the reputation of being an “honest broker,” someone
who is knowledgeable about the law and generally truthful in negotiations within a case. Based on
past interactions and reputations for credibility, attorneys can make retrospective evaluations about
their counterparts’ trustworthiness in current cases. For example, a defense attorney’s decision to
plea a case that the district attorney says will be an easy win for the prosecution will depend largely
on the defense attorney’s trust of the information presented by the district attorney.
The second aspect of these relationships between the attorneys involves forward-looking or
prospective evaluations. Attorneys also realize that they will have many dealings in the future with
their court workgroups and that their reputations will affect interactions with attorneys in their legal
community. The need to develop and maintain positive, long-term working relationships may create
a more “consensus-oriented” negotiating style for attorneys who have “frequent regularized contact”
(Kritzer 1991: 129). The likelihood of repeated actions, or the “shadow of the future” (Axelrod
1984), creates a disincentive for the actors to be dishonest brokers as it may hinder the ability to
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negotiate in the future (Dal Bo 2005). Therefore, while a prosecutor or a defense attorney may
“stretch” the truth or withhold information to gain a negotiating advantage for one particular case,
these actions may diminish that attorney’s reputation for reliability in future cases. In this way, the
long-term relationships between court actors become more important than the outcome of any
particular case (Croyle 1983; Dixon 1995; Nardulli, Eisenstien, and Flemming 1988; Ulmer 1997).
However, when strangers with no past dealings and little prospects of future contacts interact, an
actor’s trust of the other side is diminished, potentially lowering the likelihood of effective
cooperation (Macy and Skvoretz 1998). But does this play out in the same way for all kinds of
lawyers? The next section explores this question.

Differences across Practice Settings
Within the legal profession, wide variation exists in what it means to be an attorney across
different practice settings and different geographic areas, and this has implications for understanding
insider and outsider status. For instance, a prosecutor will have very different working relationships
with other attorneys than an attorney whose practice is more transactional in nature. A lawyer from
a rural family law practice may approach divorce negotiations differently than an attorney from a
large, urban firm (Mather, McEwin, and Maiman 2001). Looking to the literature, research indicates
that attorney interactions will vary by client type, firm size, geographic location, and legal specialty,
among other factors.
Over time, the cohesion observed among legal professionals in early studies of the
profession (Heinz and Laumann 1982) appears to have declined due to increased diversity,
specialization, and the overall size of the profession (Heinz et al. 1998, 2005). This has particular
relevance for our inquiry, as specialization and diversity in the profession can create boundaries for
forming professional relationships. In addition to firm size and client type, this scholarship indicates
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that attorneys’ interactions might also be diminished in the modern era, particularly in highly
specialized subfields of law. On the other hand, Landon (1985, 1992) maintains that rather than the
types of clients represented, the characteristics of the community in which a lawyer practices actually
account for the greatest difference in lawyers’ practice. In urban settings, lawyers who are primarily
engaged in solo practice are at the bottom of the career pyramid, while in a rural setting, these may
be the only jobs available. Furthermore, rural lawyers are more likely to come from the
communities where they work, have stronger bonds to the community, and are more likely to hold
leadership positions in the community. Landon’s research predicts that attorneys will have strong
connections to their communities in rural settings.
Beyond the urban or rural setting, attorneys’ working relationships also differ depending on
whether they work primarily in civil or criminal practice. As discussed above, criminal lawyers tend
to work in “courtroom workgroups” where attorneys and judges form long-term, close working
relationships (Eisenstein and Jacob 1977; Haynes, Ruback, and Cusick 2010; Ulmer and Johnson
2004; Ulmer and Kramer 1996). In contrast, attorneys who work in civil practice may have less
frequent interactions with opposing counsel and are more likely to have long-term relationships with
their clients (Kritzer 1990). Although attorneys engaged in civil practice do not have the same dayto-day working relationships with opposing counsel, negotiation and settlement are central features
of civil practice (Kritzer 1991, 2004, 2015). The need for speedy case processing, particularly for
contingency fee practices (Kritzer 1990), makes an attorney’s reputation for fairness and cooperation
especially important in civil cases (Kritzer 2004). The criminal and civil bar clearly structure attorney
interactions in different ways, suggesting that attorneys’ perceptions of their working relationships
might vary by practice type.
Despite these differences in practice areas, Kritzer’s work points to trust as a key factor in
shaping attorneys’ working relationships across the board. Most legal conflicts, regardless of issue
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area, typically involve two sides that must work together to achieve a resolution. And while practice
area does condition the type and frequency of attorney interactions, in general, lawyers prefer
positive working relationships with adversaries and expect reciprocity in their working relationships
with opposing counsel (Kritzer 2015). For instance, the desire to expedite cases (for civil law
practitioners) and to process greater volumes of cases (for practitioners in urban areas) also create
incentives for attorneys to engage in cooperative working relationships based on trust (Kritzer 1990,
2004, 2015). Thus, dynamics related to the establishment of working relationships more generally
may transcend differences in specialties and settings in the legal profession.

Explaining Insider and Outsider Dynamics among Attorneys
Drawing from the literature above, we posit that attorneys’ perceptions of trust will be
influenced by insider/outsider dynamics, as well as relationships and reputations established and
reaffirmed by repeat interactions. We contend that these influences will be evident in how attorneys
evaluate the trustworthiness of attorneys from outside their primary practice area and the
effectiveness of negotiations with outsiders. Taken together, these indicators have implications for
our understanding about how the negotiation process is likely to differ between insiders and
outsiders, and whether visiting or outsider attorneys are likely to face obstacles in obtaining
favorable outcomes for their clients.3
To gain a broad understanding of the legal profession at large, we first examine perceptions
of trust and effective negotiations among all attorneys in our sample, controlling for a variety of
alternative explanations. We then break out a series of subgroups to ascertain whether those same
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We do not, however, test the linkage with case outcomes here, as our primary concern is with

attorneys’ assessments of their working relationships.
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relationships hold in specific practice areas. If trust is indeed based on experiences, then in-group
favoritism should produce higher levels of trust among attorneys whose practice requires them to
interact with the same opposing attorneys frequently. These attorneys should also be more wary of
negotiations with outsiders, since they have less accumulated experience with them.
We summarize these expectations in the following broad hypotheses:
H1: Attorneys with closer ties to the local workgroup will express lower levels of trust in outsiders.
H2: Attorneys with closer ties to the local workgroup will rate negotiations with outsiders as less
effective than those with members of their own insider group.
Data and Measures
The data for this study are drawn from an original survey open to all licensed attorneys from
North Carolina. We received contact information for all attorneys from the North Carolina State
Bar, the government agency responsible for the regulating the practice of law in the state. All
attorneys practicing in the state are required to maintain current contact information with the State
Bar as part of licensure.4 In recent years this information has included email addresses for members
and uses email as a primary form of communication with attorneys.5 After receiving the official
contact information for all attorneys in the state, we invited all attorneys to participate in an online
survey in the fall of 2014. Over a period of approximately one month and after several follow-up
invitations sent to those that did not initially respond, we obtained over 2,000 usable responses6.

4

North Carolina State Bar, 2014, Rules and Regulations, Chapter 1, Subchapter A, Section .0202

5

Nearly 99% of attorneys licensed in the state have provided active email addresses.

6

We received 24,775 valid addresses from the North Carolina State Bar, and, of these 3,091

answered at least some of the questions. This yielded a response rate of 12.5%, with 2,774 providing
usable responses (11.2%).
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Comparing the demographics of our sample to the population of North Carolina attorneys, we see
that our sample consists of 66% men and 34% women, compared to 57% men and 43% women for
the State Bar (North Carolina State Bar 2013). Our sample is quite similar to estimates of the
percentage of female attorneys across the United States, as published by the American Bar
Association, which estimates that 34% of attorneys are women (American Bar Association, 2014a).
The State Bar racial composition is 87% white, 9% African American, 2% Asian, and about 3% who
identify as another race. In comparison, our sample is 92% white, 5% African American, 1% Asian,
and 2% from other races. The racial composition of our sample is very close to national
demographics, as estimates that suggest 88% of attorneys in the U.S. are white (American Bar
Association, 2014b). We also note that while most (70%) respondents stated that they primarily
work in state courts, 30% indicated that they work in federal courts. With respect to practice type
and experience, our sample also shows similar numbers as national estimates from the American Bar
Association (2014a), as depicted in Table 1.7
<< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >>
Dependent Variables
We focus on two dependent variables that relate to professional relationships and may
directly impact case outcomes. First, we asked respondents their impression of the trustworthiness
of attorneys outside of their home area in relation to “insiders.” This was a five-point scale, with
lower scores generally indicating that outsiders were less trustworthy than insiders, as indicated in
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The average years of experience for all respondents in our sample is 21 years. Presuming the
average law student graduates at 28 (Dustman and Handwerk 2010), this puts the average
respondent age at 49, which is the estimated median age of attorneys nationwide (American Bar
Association 2014b).
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Table 1. Respondents were instructed that the term “home area” referred to the “county, district,
circuit, courthouse, jurisdiction, or judicial precinct that you would consider your primary work
location.” As our focus was on measuring attorney perceptions rather than defining a specific
geographic area, we adopt this approach to allow us to assess the responses of those who generally
work in the same place compared to those attorneys who often travel to new areas. 8
However, lower levels of trust may not necessarily lead to disparate interactions between
insiders and outsiders. Noting the importance of pre-trial negotiations and plea bargains, we also
asked respondents about their perceptions of the effectiveness of negotiations with outsiders
compared to negotiations with insiders. Here again, the values ranged from one to five, with lower
values indicating that negotiations with outsiders were less effective.
Main Independent Variables
Our analyses, for both the all-attorneys models and the practice-specific models, examine the
survey respondent’s connection with her local workgroup. Two questions tap into the respondent’s
“insider status.” First, to measure direct attorney relationships, we asked respondents if they
generally interacted with the same attorneys repeatedly, a mix of the same attorneys they knew and
some they did not, or if they generally interact with unfamiliar attorneys.9 Second, as a proxy for the
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In defining the “home area” we allowed the respondents themselves to define what they

considered their home area. When asked what respondents considered their home area, 10% said it
was one city, 23% said it was one county, 36% said one judicial district, and 32% said they
considered their practice something else, such as multiple counties, statewide, national, or
international.
9

For modeling purposes, we collapsed this variable into a dichotomous measure as displayed in

Table 1, but the results did not substantially differ with the three-response format.
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geographic component of insider status, we also asked how much time the respondent spent
practicing in her “home area.” Related to our hypotheses stated above, we expect that those
attorneys who generally interact with only the same attorneys and who spend more time in their
home areas will be less trusting of outside attorneys and find negotiations less effective with outside
attorneys.10
Other Independent Variables
Additionally, all of the models include several other variables to use as controls and for
further exploration of attorney relationships. Respondents were asked about the trustworthiness of
attorneys overall, as an indicator of generalized trust. Those who are largely more satisfied with the
legal profession in general may also be more trusting of other lawyers, both insiders and outsiders.
To control for this possibility, and the potential of self-selection bias in our sample based on
professional satisfaction, we included a question based on a seven-point Likert scale of career
satisfaction. Career satisfaction is positively but weakly (r =.21) correlated with trust in attorneys
overall. However, career satisfaction is not correlated at all with trust of outside attorneys (r =.04).
This gives us some evidence of the “sunny disposition” that Uslaner links with generalized trust, but
not knowledge-based trust. We also note that the two types of trust (trust of attorneys overall and
trust of outside attorneys) are not correlated (r = .03) in our sample. Relatedly, attorneys at different
points in their careers may have different outlooks on trust, so we include a variable for years of
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While attorney interactions and time spent within one’s home area would seem to be closely

related, our insider status variables were only weakly correlated (r = .22). In supplemental analyses,
we conducted separate analyses including only one of our two insider status variables. While the
coefficients changed slightly, significance levels remained consistent regardless of whether both
insider status variables were included, or if we analyzed them separately.
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practice. Given that we have no a priori reason to expect a positive or negative relationship for years
of practice, it is included in the models primarily as a control.
<< TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >>
Concerning the gender and race of our respondents, the literature is somewhat mixed as to
professional trust. Groups who have been discriminated against are less likely to believe “most
people can be trusted,” although women score higher on scales of trust in personality inventories
(Feingold 1994). Buchan, Croson, and Solnick (2008) find that in a trust game, trusting behavior by
men reflects a more strategic orientation. We note that race could also have an influence, as Uslaner
(2002) finds that African-Americans are less likely to exhibit generalized trust. Consequently, we
include both gender and race variables as controls.
Finally, the models contain several practice-level controls that may influence professional
trust. Landon (1992) argues that the biggest difference in legal careers is the type of community in
which an attorney resides and demonstrates that rural and urban practices differ in significant ways.
To control for potential differences based on practice location, we include a geographic control for
whether the respondent’s home area is rural or urban, as well as a control for those that practice
primarily in state courts compared to all others.11 In the models for all attorneys, we include
indicators of whether the attorney works primarily in defense,12 if they primarily work in litigation,

We also included controls for whether the respondent identified their home area as a single city, a
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single county, a single district, or “other.” These alternative specifications (not shown) did not
affect statistical significance for our key measures.
12

We include “defense” as a general term that would include criminal defense (both private attorneys

and public defenders) and civil defense to assess differences between those who generally initiate
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and seven dummy variables for practice-type categories with medium/large firm attorneys as the
excluded category.13 We then run seven separate models for several subgroups of attorneys: all
litigators, civil litigators, criminal defense, prosecutors, transactional lawyers, urban attorneys, and
rural attorneys.

Results

All Attorneys Models
Beginning with our analyses of all attorneys, Table 3 reports the results from two ordinal
logit models in which higher values indicate, respectively, more trust toward outside attorneys and
more effective negotiations with outside attorneys. All models are estimated using robust standard
errors.14
In the first two models of Table 3, we see that the main variables of interest concerning an
attorney’s insider status perform largely as expected. As to trust of outside attorneys (Model 1),
attorneys who generally interact with the same attorneys repeatedly as well as those that spend a
larger percentage of time in their home area are less trusting of outside attorneys. This is indicated

litigation or bring cases to court and those who do not. We anticipate that there could be
differences between these groups that would have a separate influence from our practice categories.
13

We based our categorizations those used by the American Bar Association’s

(htttp://www.americanbar.org/resources_for_lawyers/professional_statistics.html). In other
specifications of firm size (not shown), the results remained largely the same.
14

As some of our variables, particularly the practice characteristics may be related, we checked for

multicollinearity and found no correlations among the independent variables to be above .31 and no
variance inflation factor above 1.61.
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by the negative and statistically significant coefficients for both the insider status variables in Model
1. This relationship exists even after controlling for other individual and practice variables, such as
race, gender, overall trust of attorneys, and practice types.15 We do find that those who have been
practicing for longer periods are more trusting of outsiders, and that nonwhite attorneys are more
trusting of outsiders than are white attorneys. Respondents practicing in rural areas are also less
trusting of outside attorneys, after controlling for other factors. The results for generalized trust are
somewhat counterintuitive, as respondents who express higher overall trust of attorneys are less
trusting of outsiders in particular.
In Model 2, the stronger the ties that an attorney has with their home area, as indicated by
both attorney contacts and time spent practicing within the same geographic area, the less effective
an attorney views negotiations with outsider attorneys. This is indicated by the negative and
statistically significant results in both the insider status variables in Model 2. Our other variables
also perform in a similar fashion across Models 1 and 2, as minority attorneys and those with more
years of experience find negotiations with outsider attorneys more effective. Differing from Model
1, we see that neither overall trust of attorneys nor working in a rural area appears to influence
perceptions of negotiations with out-group lawyers.16
<< TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE >>
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Only the “in-house attorney” variable shows positive and statistically significant effects at the .05

level (two-tailed) when compared to those working at a medium/large law firms in Model 1.
16

For the practice-type controls, only the variable for non-prosecutor government attorney shows

statistically significant effects. These government attorneys were more likely to report that
negotiations with outsiders were more effective than negotiations with insiders, as compared to
respondents at medium/large law firms (the excluded category).
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To explore the influence of outsider status further, Figures 1 and 2 graph the predicted
probabilities of reporting lower levels of trust (Figure 1) and less effective negotiations (Figure 2)
based on the percentage of time lawyers spend in their “home” area, holding other factors constant.
We include predictions for both those attorneys who interact mainly with the same attorneys
repeatedly (“insiders”) as depicted by the solid line in each figure and those who interact with
attorneys they do not know (“outsiders”) as shown by the dotted line in each graph. For Figure 1,
we see that distrust of outsiders rises significantly for those lawyers who spend a larger percentage of
their time within their home areas. However, distrust is much higher for those attorneys that also
interact mostly with other insiders. We see similar trends for negotiation effectiveness in Figure 2.
Here again, attorneys who spend more of their time in their home area are increasingly less likely to
see fruitful negotiations with outsiders, but these trends are much more pronounced for those
attorneys who primarily interact with other members outside of their immediate work group.
To illustrate, Attorney A spends 80% of her practice time within her own area and routinely
interacts with outsiders and attorneys she does not know. Attorney B is an attorney who spends the
same amount of time in his home area (80%) but mainly interacts with other insiders he already
knows. Attorney A has a .35 probability of reporting high distrust of those outside attorneys, while
Attorney B has a .48 probability of reporting distrust. Likewise, when examining effective
negotiations with outsiders, Attorney A finds negotiations with outsiders more fruitful, as she has a
.30 probability of reporting less effective negotiations with outsiders. However, Attorney B, who
has fewer contacts with those outside his immediate work group, has a .42 probability of reporting
less effective negotiations with outsiders.
Attorney Subgroup Models
Building on our findings in Table 3, we analyze insider status and working relationships of
attorneys within specific practice areas and settings. Perceptions of attorney trust and the
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effectiveness of negotiations may be closely tied to the particular tasks performed by the lawyers.
For example, civil litigators and those practicing criminal law constantly interact with other
attorneys, while those that deal more in transactional work (such as those that conduct real estate
closings) may rarely interact with other lawyers. To uncover the effects within particular types of
practices, we reran our models limiting the data to respondents of certain practice characteristics.
Our seven specifications included all litigators (those that reported 50% or more of their practice
was litigation), only civil litigators (those that reported 50% or more of their practice was litigation
and did not practice criminal law), criminal defense attorneys, criminal prosecutors, transactional
attorneys (defined as those that indicated working in the legal areas of contracts, bankruptcy,
copyright, corporate, insurance, wills, real estate, and/or tax), all urban attorneys, and all rural
attorneys.
Table 4 summarizes the results of our “insider status” variables on both dependent variables
(outsider trust and effective negotiations with outsiders) for each practice type. For ease of
interpretation, we indicate whether there was a statistically significant effect and the direction
(positive or negative) of the relationship for each significant variable pairing. Blank cells indicate
that an insider status variable was not statistically significant in the model. (The full results of these
analyses are available in the online appendix.)
In general, we see that our broad expectations about trust and insider status often hold up
when examining specific practice areas, but not always. The insider status variables are statistically
significant and in the predicted direction more often than not across the separate models. Overall
we see that “interacting with the same attorneys” produces significant results more often than our
“time spent in one’s home area” variable. This suggests that professional interactions (more so then
geography) play a larger role in developing professional perceptions of attorney interactions.
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With respect to particular practice characteristics, the results show that litigators who
generally interact with the same attorneys repeatedly have lower trust of outsider attorneys and find
negotiations less effective with outsiders. The more time they spend in their “home” area, the more
likely litigators are to state that negotiations with outsiders are less effective. These findings are
consistent with our hypothesized expectations in H1 and H2.
We observe noteworthy differences for other practice characteristics as well. Interestingly,
while it would seem that insider status would affect litigators and criminal law attorneys more than
transactional attorneys, the results show that transactional lawyers’ perceptions about negotiations
are also influenced by their insider status. Transactional lawyers who interact with the same
attorneys frequently and spend more time in their home areas were more likely to find negotiations
with outsiders less effective. However, insider status did not affect responses on trust of outsiders
for transactional attorneys group.
The results also show differences within the field of criminal law. Criminal defense
attorneys who identify closer ties to their workgroup report less trust and less effective negotiations
with outsiders. For criminal prosecutors, however, repeated interactions were not significant factors
in regards to trust or negotiations with outsiders and, although time spent in the prosecutor’s home
area does influence trust of outsider attorneys. Part of this could be related to the variation of the
subset, as prosecutors overall were more likely to report a higher percentage of their practice in their
home area and were more likely to indicate that they interacted with the same attorneys repeatedly.17

17

Overall, the average amount of time spent for all attorneys in their home area was 77.8%, while

the average response of time spent in the home area for prosecutors was 92%. Over the entire
sample, 23% of respondents indicated that they generally interacted with the same attorneys
repeatedly compared to 61% of prosecutors.
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Lastly, when analyzing the data for urban and rural attorneys, urban attorneys’ behavior is
consistent with our expectations in H1 and H2, but rural attorneys are not as strongly affected by ties
to the local legal community. Urban attorneys who interact more with the same lawyers are less
trusting and view negotiations with outsiders negatively. For rural attorneys, interactions matter for
both trust levels and negotiations, but spending more time within their home areas was not
significant. This again could be due to less variation among rural attorneys, as they reported
spending more time in their home area and were more likely to interact with the same attorneys than
the sample overall.18 In sum, while the findings of our subgroup analyses do not perfectly mirror the
results from the all-attorneys models, they do generally comport with the assessment that attorneys
with a greater connection to their local work area are more distrustful and pessimistic in their
assessments of interactions with those from outside that area.

Discussion
Taken as a whole, our results clearly point to several larger themes. Attorneys’ interactions
with other lawyers are colored by their status as insiders or outsiders. While all lawyers share many
of the same experiences such as their legal education and professional socialization, we still see
varying degrees of trust based on more specific in-group and out-group status. One conclusion that
may be drawn from our results is that isolation from outsiders may breed distrust in attorneys. We
consistently find that those attorneys who spend less time outside of their home areas and only
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For example, those practicing in rural areas reported spending 87% of their time in their home

area, ten percentage points higher than the average for the entire sample. Rural attorneys were also
more likely to report that they generally interacted with the same attorneys repeatedly (46%
compared to 23% overall).
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interact within their “in group” are more distrusting of outsiders. This is true even of those that are
generally more trusting of attorneys overall. Although it is unclear whether distrustful attorneys
simply limit their interactions to their local community or whether working in a relatively isolated
setting breeds distrust, both causal pathways suggests a potential cyclical effect where fewer contacts
with outside attorneys foster distrust, which creates a disincentive for attorneys to work with outside
attorneys, which itself breeds even more distrust.
While our data do not examine case outcomes, being perceived as an insider by fellow
attorneys may offer an initial advantage in pre-trial negotiations. Indeed, part of being an “insider”
includes knowing local norms about settlement and what a case is worth, as well as the cultivation of
a reputation about the types of clients represented (Mather, McEwen, and Maiman 2001; Kritzer
1991). Because attorneys have the duty to act in the best interest of their clients, this suggests that
consulting with an attorney from the local area or referring clients to local counsel may be the best
course of action. While expertise in a particular area of law, resources, or better training may offset
any “home court” advantages, our results support prior studies and anecdotal evidence that hiring an
in-group attorney can alter the negotiations for each case.
Of course, as with any project, there are some limitations to our findings. First, while insider
and outside status appear to impact legal practice broadly, the research also suggests that our focus
on negotiations may be less useful for understanding legal specialties that rely less on interactions
with other attorneys. Indeed, as the results of the subgroup analyses in Table 4 demonstrate, insider
status manifests itself differently across different practice settings. Given the broad nature of our
survey instrument, we are unable to delve more deeply into the differences detected between groups
like criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors, but a more targeted approach (e.g., Kritzer 1991)
could identify the factors contributing to this variation. We also are unable to parse out whether
differences in practice areas are a function of sorting, with more trusting individuals gravitating
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toward particular areas, although given the robustness of our results about distrust of outsiders, this
seems unlikely.
Second, because our sampling pool includes attorneys licensed from only one state, the
generalizability of our findings may appear more limited. As procedures and professional culture
may change from state to state, it is possible that surveying a different state or set of states might
result in different responses. However, our data also include attorneys who hail from outside North
Carolina; one-tenth of our sample indicated that although they were licensed in North Carolina, their
primary state of practice was in another state. We also recognize that, in spite of contacting all
licensed attorneys in the state, there may be some selection bias involved in who opted to complete
the survey, though we have no reason to suspect that a similar dynamic would not be at work in
other states. Fortunately, the demographics of our sample reflect the composition of both the
North Carolina State Bar and U.S. attorney demographic estimates, and the distribution of practice
types suggest that our sample is broadly representative of typical practice areas.
Building on our findings, researchers could use case studies to investigate how insider and
outsider status conditions the settlement process. While attorney negotiations are normally outside
the scope of official court records, future work could also examine general trends from plea bargains
to investigate whether disparate treatment exists for criminal defendants represented by out-group
attorneys when compared to defendants represented by in-group lawyers. Likewise, examining
motions for sanctions following alleged discovery abuses may reveal differing trends when
comparing filings against outsiders and those against insiders. Beyond the distinctions identified
here, attorneys may be viewed as insiders or outsiders in other contexts, such as being associated
with economically affluent (or depressed) areas. Litigants, too, may be categorized as insiders or
outsiders, which may mediate the impact of a local or outsider attorney in negotiations and case
outcomes. The influence of insider status (for litigants as well as attorneys) could also result in
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disparate treatment from other legal actors, such as judges or court staff. These and other routes of
exploration may help us to better understand the dynamics of attorney relationships and the
influence on case outcomes.
While much of the social science and legal scholarship about the courts focuses on judicial
behavior, this project joins the growing line of research that examines our judicial system without
focusing on someone wearing a black robe. Given that such a high percentage of disputes are
resolved through negotiations between the parties, it is important to investigate attorney
relationships, trust levels, and the impact that those relationships have on our legal system.
However, much of these interactions go on (literally) behind closed doors, making it difficult for
researchers to observer these phenomena and identify key trends. By moving beyond reliance on
anecdotes, this study demonstrates how a systematic examination of attorneys’ working relationships
can uncover important trends that have both practical and theoretical implications for the American
legal system.
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Table 1: Comparison of Sample Demographics to National and State Bar Estimates
Characteristic

Sample

ABA National
NC Bar
Estimates
Estimates
Percentage White/Caucasian
91%
88%
87%
Male
66%
65%
57%
Private Practice
73%
75%
n/a
Government Attorney
12%
8%
n/a
Private Industry
6%
8%
n/a
Legal Aid
2%
1%
n/a
Note: The North Carolina Bar Association does not provide detailed information on practice type
for its members.
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Table 2: Coding of Included Variables
Variable
Trust of Outside
Attorneys (DV #1)

Negotiations with
Outside Attorneys
(DV #2)

Interact with Same
Attorneys
Percentage of
Practice in Home
Area
Overall Trust of All
Attorneys
Overall Career
Satisfaction
Experience
Female Attorneys
Nonwhite Attorney
Practice in a Rural
Area
Primarily Defense
Attorney
Primary Litigation
Primarily State
Practice
Practice Types

Coding
(N for each category or mean in parentheses)
1=outside attorneys much less trustworthy
2=outside attorneys somewhat less trustworthy
3 = outside attorneys about the same
4= outside attorneys somewhat more trustworthy
5= outside attorneys much more trustworthy
1=negotiations much less effective with outsiders
2=negotiations somewhat less effective with outsiders
3=negotiations about the same with outsiders
4=negotiations somewhat more effective with outsiders
5=negotiations much more effective with outsiders
Independent Variables
1= generally interact with only the same attorneys
0= other
Percentage of practice spent in one’s home area

Years since bar passage

(645)
(2,111)

(mean = 77%)

1 = attorneys less trustworthy than general public
2= equally trustworthy
3= attorneys are more trustworthy
1 to 7 scale, higher values represent more satisfaction

(78)
(754)
(1,414)
(38)
(4)
(75)
(634)
(1,407)
(120)
(15)

(74)
(1,231)
(986)
(mean = 5.2)
(mean=21)

0=male
1=female
0=white
1=nonwhite
0=urban area
1=rural area
1= primary defense
0=other
1= over 50% of practice is litigation
0 =other
1 = Primarily practice in state courts
0 = Mix of state and federal practice or primarily federal
Solo Practitioner/Small firm (1,027)
Legal Aid (47)
Medium/Large Firm (625)(base term)
Prosecutor (74)
In-House Attorney (179)
Other (62)
Government (non-prosecutor) (210)
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(1,490)
(764)
(2,063)
(184)
(1,796)
(390)
(767)
(1,989)
(1,979)
(777)
(1,470)
(616)

Table 3: Relationships with Attorneys Outside the Workgroup
Model 1: Trust of
Outside Attorneys
Ordered Logit
Coef. (RSE)

Model 2: Effective
Negotiations with
Outsiders
Ordered Logit
Coef. (RSE)

Insider Status
Interact with Same
Attorneys

-.367**
(.107)

-.489**
(.114)

Percentage of Practice in
Home Area

-.006**
(.002)

-.005*
(.002)

Overall Trust of All
Attorneys

-.189*
(.097)

-.071
(.093)

Overall Career Satisfaction

.021
(.029)

.044
(.030)

Experience

.016**
(.004)
.036
(.103)
.493**
(.190)

.012**
(.004)
.052
(.109)
.506**
(.184)

Practice in a Rural Area

-.443**
(.124)

-.212
(.125)

Primarily Defense Attorney

-.011
(.100)

-.036
(.101)

Primarily Litigation

-.148
(.101)
-.121
(.111)

.134
(.100)
-.130
(.109)

-.078
(.115)
.540**
(.202)
.477
(.316)

.129
(.112)
.089
(.192)
.744
(.396)

VARIABLE

Other Respondent
Characteristics

Female Attorneys
Nonwhite Attorney
Practice
Characteristics

Primarily State Practice
Practice Types
Solo /Small Firm
In-House Counsel
Prosecutor
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Government (non-prosecutor)
Legal Aid
Other Practice Type
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Constant
N
Wald Chi-Squared
Prob > chi(2)
Pseudo R2

.290
(.171)
-.023
(.351)
-.179
(.331)

.405*
(171)
.223
(.320)
.025
(.308)

-4.69
(.494)
-1.77
(.461)
2.80
(.488)
5.06
(.688)
-1967
92.57
0.000**
0.028

-3.82
(.484)
-1.12
(.467)
2.46
(.477)
4.82
(.548)
-1948
65.26
0.000**
0.018

Notes: * p < .05 (two-tailed). ** p < .01 (two-tailed). Base term (excluded category) for “Practice Types” is
“medium/large firm.”
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Table 4: Summary of Alternative Specifications
Attorney Type

Model 1: Less Trusting
of Outsiders

Model 2: Negotiations Are
Less Effective with Outsiders

Interacts with the same attorneys

Yes (+)

Yes (+)

Spends more time in their home area

---

Yes (+)

Interacts with the same attorneys

---

---

Spends more time in their home area

---

Yes (+)

Interacts with the same attorneys

Yes (+)

Yes (+)

Spends more time in their home area

---

Yes

Interacts with the same attorneys

---

---

Spends more time in their home area

Yes (+)

---

Interacts with the same attorneys

---

Yes (+)

Spends more time in their home area

---

Yes (+)

Interacts with the same attorneys

Yes (+)

Yes (+)

Spends more time in their home area

Yes (+)

Yes (+)

Interacts with the same attorneys

Yes (+)

Yes (+)

Spends more time in their home area

---

---

Litigators

Civil Litigators

Criminal Defense

Criminal Prosecutors

Transactional Attorneys

Urban Attorneys

Rural Attorneys

Notes: Entries in each cell indicate whether the relationship is statistically significant at p<.05 (twotailed) and if so, the direction of the effect. Full model results available in the online appendix.
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